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Abstract 
 
The paper considers the legal and social conditions for bringing into being a 
European Civil Code, an item on the Community’s agenda since 1999. While 
the project is seen as having great potential for the future, several conditions 
should be required to ensure its legitimacy: refraining from replacing national 
codifications by decree, preparation by an appropriate transnational institution as 
vehicle, and only  limited central judicial review through an effective European 
court system. 
  




The calls for unification of private law in Europe by now have a history decades 
long. Starting in the sixties, from scholars and politicians,
1 they led initially to 
the formation of transnational academic research groups to do comparative-law 
preliminary work. The best known is the  Lando Commission on European 
contract law, in existence for over twenty years now and called after its Danish 
founder and chair Ole Lando, which in 1998 presented a complete compilation 
of principles of European contract law.
2 In early 1998 the Study Group on a 
European Civil Code was also founded, as successor to the Lando Commission 
but with a wider composition and a new organizational structure, which intends 
to work out a more thorough draft codification of further areas of private law.
3 
Additionally, in 1999 the Académie des Privatistes Européens published a first 




The European Parliament has twice, in 1989 and 1994
5, called for the 
development of a codification of private law. While these resolutions initially 
met with little response, the unification project for the first time met with 
interest from the Council at the Cologne summit of Heads of State and of 
Government in Spring 1999, and at the Special Summit of Ministers of Justice 
and Home Affairs in Tampere in Autumn 1999. The Commission was then 
mandated to draw up a report by the end of 2001 on progress with the work, 
with five Directorates-General (enterprises, market, legal service, health and 
consumer protection, justice and home affairs) involved. In the European 
                                                 
*Research Fellow at the European University Institute in Florence, and Habilitation Candidate 
at the University of Munich. This paper is an expanded, revised version of the one the author 
gave on 21 November 2000 to a hearing on harmonisation of civil and commercial law before 
the Legal Affairs Committee of the European Parliament in Brussels. For the help with the 
English version, I wish to thank Ian L. Fraser. For comments and criticisms, I am indebted to 
the participants of the hearing, Christian Joerges and Luke Nottage. 
1 Cf. Hallstein, RabelsZ 28 (1964), 211. 
2 Cf.  Lando/Beale  (Eds.), Principles of European Contract Law  – Parts I and II, 1999; an 
instructive comparison of the  Lando  Principles (and the UNIDROIT Principles) with German 
law is offered by  Basedow (Ed.), E uropäische Vertragsrechtsvereinheitlichung und deutsches 
Recht, 2000. 
3 The Study Group is directed by a Steering Committee consisting of Professors Guido Alpa, 
Christian v. Bar, Ulrich Drobnig, Roy Goode, Arthur Hartkamp and Ole Lando. 
4  Académie des Privatistes Européens  (Eds), Code Européen des Contrats, Avant-Projet, 
Coordinateur: Giuseppe Gandolfi, 1999. 
5 EC OJ 1989 C 158, 400 and OJ 1994 C 205, 518. RSCAS 2001/14 © 2001 Christoph U. Schmid  4




The study recommends a code to replace the national codifications in 
areas of private law close to the internal market.
7 These are termed “patrimonial 
law” (Vermögensrecht), and encompass the law of obligations and personal 
property. Regarding  further procedure the study counsels concluding the 
academic preliminary work speedily, and immediately then deciding, in 
accordance with the prevailing political and legal environment, whether its 
adoption should be as a measure of approximation of laws pursuant to Article 95 
TEC by majority decision, or as an international agreement. In either case the 
ECJ preliminary ruling competence should be extended unchanged to it too.
8 
 
As against this, the present paper will develop the position that while 
unification of law of private law is desirable, major obstacles in relation to the 
project’s legitimacy have undoubtedly to be overcome:
9 compliance with 
competence rules, and the principles of necessity and subsidiarity, which by 
their raison d’être would also h ave to guarantee acceptance of the project; 
continuing social, political and cultural differences among Member States and 
the resulting problems for a central “concretisation competence” of European 
courts; finally, the need for a suitable institution to base it on. In relation to these 
reservations, this article recommends adopting a code not by majority decision 
but as a measure of enhanced co-operation; its limitation on the Community side 
to inter-State matters, its preparation by an independent legal i nstitution on the 
American model
10; and its monitoring by a European court of private law, which 
would in the context of the preliminary procedure give opinions not binding on 
national higher courts. 
                                                 
6 Study of EU private-law systems in relation to discrimination and the creation of a European 
civil code, European Parliament, Directorate-General for science, legal questions series, JURI 
103 DE and EN (October 1999), Director: Christian  v. Bar. In detail the study analyses the 
need for unification and the options in the areas of general law of contract, law of service 
contracts, insurance contract law, extracontractual obligations, credit guarantee  law and law 
of civil procedure. 
7 V. Bar (Fn. 6), 134ff. 
8 Tilmann/van Gerven (Fn. 6), 183 (203). 
9 The term “legitimacy“ is used here in the sense of Max Weber’s notion of “Legitimation”. 
The central point is the question why and in what conditions the structure of the existing 
social order is accepted or at least tolerated by the subjects and groups that constitute it, and 
therefore manages to exist at all (Cf.  Kübler, Über die praktischen Aufgaben zeitgemäßer 
Privatrechtstheorie, 1975, 27). 
10 Taking up f rom earlier proposals, in:  T. Ackermann  et al. (eds.), Tradition und Fortschritt 
im Recht, Jahrbuch Junger Zivilrechtswissenschaftler 1999, 33 (54ff). RSCAS 2001/14 © 2001 Christoph U. Schmid  5
II. The current debate 
 
The arguments brought to bear in  favour of a European code are not hard to 
follow:
11 a common market needs a uniform infrastructure of private law able to 
stand up in global competition to US law. The existing variety of laws instead 
constitutes a trade-restricting measure able to lead even to distortions of 
competition, scarcely compatible with European fundamental freedoms. 
Additionally, the existing legal differences threaten legal certainty and lead to 
high costs of legal actions; cases of dispute become more likely, and mostly 
harder t o resolve too. The European multi-level regime consisting of 
international, European and national strata of law is taking on increasingly 
chaotic proportions. A code would by contrast bring the legal unity desired by 
business, lawyers and citizens alike. Case law and doctrine would be shifted into 
a new European framework where they could co-operate more effectively – as it 
were with economies of scale  – something that ought not least to benefit the 
quality of law.
12 Finally, a code with equal rights for all European citizens would 
have a certain symbolic content that could contribute to a common identity. 
 
                                                 
11 Among the now immense literature, in favour are  Lando, Unfair Contract Clauses and a 
European Uniform C ommercial Code in: Cappelletti (ed.), New Perspectives for a Common 
Law of Europe, 1978;  Gandolfi, Per un codice europeo dei contratti,  Rivista trimestrale di 
diritto e procedura civile 46 (1991), 781;  Tilmann,  in:  Müller-Graff  (ed.) Gemeinsames 
Privatrecht in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, 1st Ed. 1993, 2nd Ed. 1999, 579; Hartkamp et 
al. (eds.), Towards a European Civil Code, 1st Ed. 1994, 2nd Ed. 1998 with new articles; 
Towards a European Civil Code, ERPL 5 (1997), vol. 4; Basedow, A Common Contract Law 
for the Common Market: CMLR 33 (1996), 1169; Lando, Making a European Private Law in: 
Kreuzer/Scheuing/Sieber (eds.), Die Europäisierung der mitgliedstaatlichen Rechtsordnungen 
in der Europäischen Union (1997),  idem,  Optional or Mandatory Europeanisation of Contract 
Law, in: Feiden/C. Schmid (eds.), Evolutionary Perspectives and Projects on Harmonisation 
of Private Law in the EU, EUI Working Paper Law No. 7 (1999), 57 = ERPL 8 (2000), 59; 
Lurger, Grundfragen der Vereinheitlichung des Vertragsrechts in der EU, Habilitationsschrift 
Graz 1999; from a French viewpoint Chamboredon, The Debate on the European Civil Code, 
For an „Open Texture“, in: Van Hoecke/Ost (eds.), The Harmonisation of European Private 
Law, 2000, 63.- See also on the debate  Taupitz, Europäische Privatrechtsvereinheitlichung 
heute und morgen, 1993;  Remien, ZfRV 1995, 116 (119ff);  Zimmermann, Codification: 
history and present significance of an idea; ERPL 3 (1995), 95;  Hirte, Wege zu einem 
europäischen Zivilrecht, 1996;  Teichmann, in: Dörr/Dreher (eds.), Europa als 
Rechtsgemeinschaft, 1997;  Armbruster, JR 1998, 98;  Basedow, The Renascence of Uniform 
Law, Journal of Legal Studies 18 (1998), 121;  Coester-Waltjen, Jura 1998, 320;  Schmidt-
Jortzig, AnwBl. 1998, 63;  Grundmann, NJW 1999, 34ff;  Sonnenberger,  JZ 1999, 982; 
Basedow  AcP 200 (2000), 445;  Wuermeling/v. Graevenitz, Europäisches Privatrecht: Wider 
den Oktroi der Uniformität, forthcoming in EuR 2001;  Nottage, Convergence, Divergence, 
and the Middle Way in Unifying or Harmonising Private Law, forthcoming as EUI Working 
Paper Law, 2001. 
12 Summers, ZEuP 7 (1999), 201. RSCAS 2001/14 © 2001 Christoph U. Schmid  6
  These arguments have provoked a multiplicity of legally, economically 
and socio-culturally based responses. A number of them, however, lack force on 
their face. Thus, the existing international unification of private law constitutes 
no alternative, since it is still far too full of gaps. The resulting co-existence of 
unitary law with national law invoked according to rules of private international 
law instead often leads to tough problems of conflict, with great losses of legal 
certainty.
13 Further, the differences between European continental legal systems 
and common law in style, method, legal culture, legal thinking and legal training 
are by no means insuperable.
14 This is confirmed not just by the numerous 
common features brought out by functional legal comparison, but also by their 
normally problem-free co-existence in everyday legal life in the Community. 
 
  Other counter-arguments, by contrast, deserve more respect. Thus, from 
an economic viewpoint it is claimed that the benefit of a code might possibly not 
justify the indubitably high adjustment costs, so that cost-benefit analyses 
should first be made, on the basis of empirical data.
15 On this it must on the one 
hand be admitted that such analyses, which admittedly go beyond legal 
expertise, certainly could be useful. On the other hand, uniform private law 
would undoubtedly constitute an important investment for the future, which 
could in time amortise initial adjustment costs – a question which in view of the 
difficulty of forecasting future developments can scarcely be resolved decisively 
by economic analyses. It is further alleged that a uniform code would make 
impossible a competition of legal systems – offering legal subjects possibilities 
of choice and continually impelling national legislators to improve their own 
law. The answer here is that such advantages have to date hardly been realized, 
in view of the great practical legal (in such matters as duration of procedures, or 
costs) systematic and dogmatic differences, and linguistic, informational and 
mobility barriers.
16 Additionally, a code would of course have to lay down 
appropriate revision mechanisms in order to get rid of recognised weaknesses 
and work against tendencies to rigidification. Finally, the fact that the 
international economy, associations and networks have already created flexible 
                                                 
13 Cf.  Kropholler, Internationales Einheitsrecht, 1975;  C. Schmid, Das Zusammenspiel von 
Einheitlichem UN-Kaufrecht und nationalem Recht, 1996. 
14 Though this is claimed by  Legrand, Against a European Civil Code, MLR 60 (1997), 321; 
and similarly by  Paasilehto, in: Heiskanen/Kulovesi (eds.), Function and Future of European 
Law, Helsinki 1999, 99; on the whole issue see also Bussani, “Integrative“ Comparative Law 
Enterprises and the Inner Stratification of Legal Systems, in: Feiden/C. Schmid (Fn. 11), 57 = 
ERPL 8 (2000), 85. 
15 Cf. Mattei, A transaction cost approach to the European Code, ERPL 5 (1997), 537; and in 
general, Kötz, RabelsZ 186 (1986), 1. 
16 Cf.  Dreher, Wettbewerb oder Vereinheitlichung der Rechtsordnungen in Europa, JZ 1999, 
105 (110) with further references. RSCAS 2001/14 © 2001 Christoph U. Schmid  7
private norms and dispute-settlement mechanisms, such as standardised terms of 
contract and arbitration  courts,
17 which seem to fit their needs well, cannot be 
denied, and is even to be welcomed as social self-organization (“private 
governance”). But there are also many actors – small and medium-sized firms, 
and European citizens  – to whom such mechanisms are available only 
restrictedly, or not at all. Furthermore, a European code would by no means 
prevent or hamper private autonomous governance or dispute settlement, but on 
the contrary stabilise them still more, by creating a “transnational default legal 
system”. It is this very function that seems to establish the superiority of English 
and American law in the formulation of international contracts. 
 
  All in all, we can probably justify a preliminary verdict that uniform 
European private law on the successful model of the American Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC) might be of great benefit for the areas of private law 
of greatest importance to international trade. To be sure, in relation to legal 
bases and forms of action, institutional preparation and modes of j udicial 
review, considerable legitimacy problems have to be overcome, and the success 
of the project would presumably decisively depend upon solving these. 
 
 
III. Legitimacy Problems 
 
1. Competence, necessity and subsidiarity 
 
For harmonisation of private law, in the system of the EC Treaty it is primarily 
the internal-market harmonisation competence pursuant to Article 95 (former 
100 a) EC-Treaty (TEC) that comes into question. Since private law constitutes 
the essential legal infrastructure for market transactions and, reportedly, the 
prevailing legal differences bring difficulties in market access, distortions of 
competition and higher transaction costs, unification of the areas of private law 
mentioned is presumably covered by this legal basis.
18 This ought also to apply 
to statutory obligations, which have an indispensable complementary function to 
the law of contract, as compensatory arrangements. The fact that the more “non-
market” areas of a civil code, such as in particular family and inheritance law, 
are not in the province of the Community legislators does no harm, since 
unifying them is in any case at present not planned. As far as the legal form is 
                                                 
17 Cf. Collins, Formalism and efficiency, ERPL 8 (2000), 211. 
18 On this cf.  Deckert/Lilienthal, EWS 1999, 121;  Tilmann/van Gerven, (Fn. 6), 183; 
Basedow, AcP 200 (2000), 474 ff. RSCAS 2001/14 © 2001 Christoph U. Schmid  8
concerned, Article 95 TEC would allow not just a directive, but also a regulation 
on the approximation of laws.
19 
 
  Any intensification of competence review that the ECJ may have brought 
in through the judgement on the Tobacco Advertising Directive
20 presumably 
hardly stands in the way of adducing Article 95 TEC as the legal basis.
21 The 
considerations of the Community legislator in that judgement on the desirability 
of removing obstacles to the free movement of advertising vehicles and services, 
as well as distortions of competition, are fairly obviously not valid for 
promoting the internal market.
22 This would be in no way the case for the 
unification of private law. 
 
  By contrast, the hurdle of the test of necessity is harder to clear. 
According to this, the approximation of laws is only permitted to the extent it is 
required for the functioning on the internal market (Arts. 3 h, 95 (1), 5 (3) TEC). 
In this context, the alternatives of mere unification of conflict-of-laws 
provisions, harmonisation only of binding regulations, minimum harmonisation 
or the point-by-point harmonisation practised can be excluded as they are less 
well-suited to removing the drawbacks of legal diversity already described. 
However, a demand to confine a code to international situations as a “milder 
means” seems quite conceivable, particularly since it would render possible the 
                                                 
19 A declaration on the Single European Act (see OJ 1987 L 169/24) laid down the preference 
for directives. This can however apply only in the case of equal suitability, which would be 
difficult to sustain here; cf.  Basedow, AcP 200 (2000), 480. However, only a measure 
replacing national codes would seem covered, but not a European code alongside them for 
international transactions. For according to ECJ case law (Opinion 1/94, WTO, ECR [1994], 
I-5267, N° 59) Art. 95 TEC allows only the European shaping of national legal institutions, 
but not the creation of “new titles overlaying national ones”. Cf. Tilman/van Gerven, (Fn. 9), 
195, N° 50ff. 
20 Judgment of 5.10.2000, Case C-376/98, Germany v. EP and Council. 
21 This question was raised in the EP working document (Rapporteur: Lehne), PE 294.922, p. 
4. 
22 On this cf. Advocate-General  Fennelly in his closing statement, N°. 113: “From a legal 
viewpoint a measure the sole effect of which is to prohibit an economic activity cannot be 
regarded as removing barriers to  trade in connection with that activity.” Also against any 
basic change in the case law on competence review is the fact that the ECJ despite the 
directive’s manifest concentration on health protection even allowed the prohibition of 
particular forms of advertising and sponsoring, with qualified reference to the internal market 
– for instance, a ban on advertising in magazines, the further importation of which into other 
Member States might otherwise be endangered by national advertising bans existing there, or 
a ban on advertising at sports events that might compel them to move to other States, 
something that would have considerable effects on competition conditions for the firms 
running them. It was only the wholesale, comprehensive ban that went too far for him (Case 
C-376/98, Germany v. EP and Council, nos. 98, 11, 117). RSCAS 2001/14 © 2001 Christoph U. Schmid  9
continued existence of the national codes. That special European law for 
international situations would only partly remove the complexity of the 
European multi-level regime and create further demarcation problems with the 
sphere of application,
23 is something that cannot be denied. It should not, 
however, affect the functioning of the internal market to a significant degree. 
Such overall considerations as facilitating purchases in other Member States 
(which cannot be assessed all round as border-crossing situations) or avoiding 
distortions to competition, generally used in the private-law directives, can 
hardly be sufficient either to justify such a comprehensive project as a Civil 
Code. 
 
  Finally, the limit set by the subsidiarity principle on exercise of 
competence is to be complied with. But even its applicability can be doubted, on 
the argument that the competence for approximation of laws pursuant to Article 
95 (formerly 100 a) TEC constitutes an exclusive competence (Article 5, second 
sentence, TEC). This problem is not easy to clarify because the TEC 
unfortunately does not define the concept or extent of exclusive competencies. 
In the Tobacco Advertising Case Advocate-General Nial Fennelly now affirms 
exclusive competence in the case of Article 95 TEC. He refers to the fact that 
the harmonisation of legal provisions of relevance to the internal market can de 
iure and de facto be handled only by the Community, and here, by contrast with 
the areas of concurrent powers like health protection, uniform results are to be 
attained.
24 Yet in determining competence one could focus, instead of on the 
overall objective of creating the internal market, also on the regulation of 
specific legal areas required for it, where Community law and national law 
regularly complement each other (and not just national implementation law, but 
also autonomous national law not instrumental to the market). In favour of this 
interpretation is the fact that the otherwise very far-reaching restriction of the 
sphere of application of the subsidiarity principle would be in contradiction to its 
raison d’ être, of constituting a counter-weight to centralization tendencies 
                                                 
23 So v. Bar, EP Study (Fn. 6), 134ff. 
24 Conclusions, 131-142. To be sure,  Fennelly’s  argument (N° 142) contains an addition 
relating to outcomes, capable of in principle militating against the value of the subsidiarity 
test: “There is no test of comparative efficiency between possible action by the Member 
States or by the Community. Were there one, even harder questions of principle would arise. 
One would in particular have to ask how the b enefit of a Community harmonization measure 
to promote the internal market were to be weighed against provisions of individual Member 
States about completely different national interests of an opposite nature.” But just this 
handling of conflicting objectives  – rather than judging them through legal concepts  – is what 
a legitimate European governance has to do. Similarly to  Fennelly,  already  Müller-Graff, 
ZHR 159 (1995), 68ff. RSCAS 2001/14 © 2001 Christoph U. Schmid  10
particularly in the adoption of secondary law.
25 Even were one, however, to 
assume concurrent competence in the light of this, the  comparative efficiency 
test of the subsidiarity principle following affirmation of the necessity of a 
harmonisation measure (logically primary in terms of norms, as being already 
necessary for the existence of competence) could in any case scarcely supply 
any further points for assessment. That is the position here too: if the necessity 
of harmonisation of certain areas of private law is taken as given, then it can 
come about bindingly only at Community level. Beyond this one could of course 
see as rooted in the subsidiarity principle, in line with its origin in catholic social 
teaching, independently or even in conflict with efficiency viewpoints, the legal, 
ethical and legitimatory preferability of solving political questions at a lower 
level, though this might go beyond the tenor of Article 5(2) TEC. Yet such a 
broad interpretation is unlikely, in view of the existing case law, which has 
regularly allowed great discretion to the Community legislator. All in all, only 
the necessity principle presumably constitutes an obstacle to be taken in any way 
seriously in the event of codification to be applied to domestic and international 
situations equally. 
 
  If despite these reservations this sort of codification were adopted as a 
measure of approximation of laws pursuant to Article 95 TEC, then likely not all 
Member States would agree, so that the existing possibility of majority decision 
would have to be made use of. Outvoted Member States could then bring an 
action for nullity on ultra vires grounds before the ECJ; should this action fail, 
even proceedings before national constitutional courts for exceeding the national 
constitutional enabling clauses (the “integration empowerments” providing the 
legal basis for a State’s membership in the EU) would be conceivable. But still 
more seriously, even could the legal obstacles be overcome, a “thin” 
legitimation by majority decision would be the worst conceivable starting 
position for replacing national codes by a European one. Against this 
background, acceptance of the project – which by its very rationale is aimed at 
guaranteeing competence provisions and the necessity and subsidiarity 
principles – should be considered more closely. 
 
                                                 
25 Thus, mutatis mutandis, Lenaerts/van Ypersele, Le Principe de Subsidiarité et son Contexte, 
Cahiers du Droit Européen 1994, 3 (28f); v.  Bogdandy/Nettesheim, in: Grabitz/Hilf (eds.), 
Kommentar zur Europäischen Union, Stand 1998, Art. 3 b, Rn. 30;  Franzen, 
Privatrechtsangleichung durch die EG, 1999, 58ff. RSCAS 2001/14 © 2001 Christoph U. Schmid  11
2. Acceptance of a European code by citizens and jurists 
 
As regards forecasts of acceptance of a European code, attention should go first 
to the differing acceptance of national private-law codifications on the one hand 
and European economic and private law on the other. National private law has 
over time gained high acceptance as a universal, decentralized system of justice 
and as an area of autonomy against government intervention. The liberal project 
for a private-law society based on this even preceded, in Germany, the 
development of the democratic State, and while it has lost its exclusivity on 
account of its integration into the welfare state, it nonetheless retains an 
important value.
26 Its essential symbol is the big national codifications of the 
previous century, which have now outlasted several social and political systems. 
By many they are assessed as “cultural monuments”
27 and are also rooted in the 
collective consciousness as a component of national identity. Still stronger 
seems the affinity of the large majority of national jurists with codifications. 
They have been familiar with  them since their studies, and codifications have 
made essential contributions to their economic basis of life and professional 
self-perception. Not much is changed in this estimate by the fact that the 
codifications have frequently changed over time; are i n part, like the law of 
obligations in the German Civil Code, regarded as “overdogmatised”; contain 
failed provisions; or that the law in force today is only to a modest extent to be 
found in them, being in the main case law. For on the one hand, judicial 
concretisation, supplementation and correction of the codifications ensure the 
functionality and “relative” consistency of the national legal systems; and on the 
other, the affinity of national lawyers for their codifications is presumably not 
solely rationally but also emotionally based. 
 
  Community law has not to date reached any comparable legitimation or 
acceptance. Although today European market law forms the legal framework for 
exercising private autonomy and helps it to overcome national borders, it is not 
rooted to a similar extent in the collective identity. 
 
  As far as the citizens are concerned, this is on the one hand because 
Community law is less perceptible to most in everyday legal life. On the other, 
its “identificatory potential” is from the outset less, since the Community itself 
is less identity-creating than the nation States, with their societies tending to 
                                                 
26 Fundamentally, F. Böhm, Ordo 17 (1966), 75; Mestmäcker, RJ 10 (1991), 177; for critical 
comments see Stolleis, RJ 11 (1992), 502; Günther, ibid., 473; Vesting, in: H. Schlosser (ed.), 
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch 1896-1996, 183. 
27 In the words of  Flume, ZIP 2000, 1427 (1429); similarly on Common Law, Collins, 
European Private Law and the Cultural Identity of States, ERPL 3 (1995), 353. RSCAS 2001/14 © 2001 Christoph U. Schmid  12
inclusivity.
28 Instead, Community law is perceived in the public consciousness 
more as a non-transparent botch-up by a remote supra-national bureaucracy. 
Here too the demos lags, as it were, behind the actual circumstances.
29  
 
Among very many national jurists Community law, especially the private 
law directives, similarly do not enjoy the best of reputations, though mainly 
because of the problems of legal application and the efficiency deficits it brings. 
Thus, first, the substantive improvements it has brought particularly in consumer 
protection are, in comparison to the stage already reached in many domestic 
legal systems, rather modest. Additionally, the often poor quality of Community 
private law is increasingly criticized.
30 What counts most against it, though, is its 
functionally selective regulatory approach, which has led to an 
incomprehensible permeation of national systems with islands of Community 
law that grow ever larger, causing numerous fragmentations, unforeseen 
constraints to harmonisation, and contradictions.
31 In the European multi-level 
system, European lawyers must consequently “serve many masters”
  32, the 
spheres of influence of whom are upheld by various supreme courts. 
   
In view of these facts, the chances of acceptance of a European Civil 
Code has to be assessed ambivalently. On the one hand, the project would have 
the potential of intensifying problems of application o f law in the European 
multi-level system by largely replacing it by a unitary legal text, something 
                                                 
28 For a penetrative discussion see Grimm, JZ 1995, 581 (587ff); Scharpf, Regieren in Europa, 
1999, 16ff. 
29 Generally on this finding as regards European integration, see  Lindseth, Democratic 
Legitimacy and the Administrative Character of Supranationalism, Columbia L. Rev. 99 
(1999), 628 (644; 691ff.). 
30 Thus, the conflict rules in several directives were not harmonized with the 1980 Rome 
agreement; academic s econdary literature is simply ignored, so that the quality of directives 
often lags behind the contemporary stage of scholarship.  Cf.  Kieninger/Leible, EuZW 1999, 
37.-  A further example is the binding nature of the guarantee directive, whereby commercial 
sellers can no longer, without exception, cut the guarantee out even of individually negotiated 
agreements (as opposed to standard forms). This regulation would mean that particular 
second-hand items could no longer be sold at all, or only at higher prices, since the seller has 
to cover the liability risk. For a prominent critique, see most recently  Canaris, AcP 200 
(2000), 276 (362ff.). 
31 Cf. Hommelhoff, AcP 192 (1992), 71 (102); Ulmer, JZ 1992, 1 (6); Rittner, JZ 1995, 849 
(851). Not much is changed here b y the true perception that the Community measures can 
certainly be reconstructed from a functional viewpoint as a separate regulatory system, as it 
were balancing State failure against market failure (cf. Grundmann (Fn. 11), 25ff). For this is 
not identical with the internal and external system of a codification, nor does it have its 
advantages for the application of the law. 
32 Following Kelsen’s famous Bible quotation, Pure Theory, 2
nd ed., 1960, 330. RSCAS 2001/14 © 2001 Christoph U. Schmid  13
national lawyers would presumably find attractive. For the European citizen it 
might constitute a more “identifying” symbol of membership in a larger 
European Community. On the other hand  – and presumably far more 
importantly – a European code would have to take on the far from easy heritage 
of Community private law. The biggest consequences here would presumably be 
that a European Civil Code  – unless conceived as a special European law for 
intra-State situations – would have to replace the national codifications in their 
essential contents. 
   
For these reasons, it is questionable whether even an ideal European code 
of impeccable legal quality would meet with  adequate acceptance. While most 
citizens would no doubt be ready to leave their national codes as long as 
continued good operation of the administration of justice in private law were 
guaranteed, it would no doubt be different for the bulk of domestic lawyers, for 
whom the humanly typical reluctance to give up tried and tested familiar 
structures if not absolutely necessary might easily gain the upper hand. In 
particular, domestic lawyers would probably scarcely accept the replacement of 
the national codifications through majority decision on Council without a right 
to speak for themselves and without assent by their own State. This sort of step 
could easily be seen as a further erosion of national self-determination. A 
possible parallel worthy of attention is the dispute on the spelling reform in the 
German language area  – superficially a similar “technical” modernization 
project, yet meeting unexpected resistance from many citizens who see it as 
damaging a cultural symbol. Against this background, fair, academically 
balanced assessment of an imposed European codification is hardly to be 
expected. Instead, the numerous critics among national lawyers would start from 
alleged dogmatic weak points, solutions ill-adapted to national circumstances or 
just constructions unfamiliar to the national observer, using these to develop a 
general fundamental critique they could readily use to win over public opinion 
and policy against the project. 
 
3. Judicial concretisation and legitimacy of European decisions 
 
Also of great importance to the functionality and acceptance of a Code in 
practice would be its judicial concretisation. The existing national codifications 
too, after all, are only basic legal frameworks which are essentially extended, 
refined and in part modified t hrough case law. In this connection the first 
problem arising is that the rich case law “acquis” gained over decades and 
centuries in concretising the national codifications  – which is also an 
economically valuable public asset
33 – would largely get lost. For in concretising 
a new code the courts would have to start again from the beginning. It could 
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then take decades before today’s level of predictability and rationality of 
decisions would be reached again. 
 
  A still more burdensome problem in concretising a code, however, lies in 
the distribution of roles between European and national courts. In order to 
guarantee uniform interpretation, given the dogmatic, systematic and methodical 
differences among European courts, calls are generally made to extend the 
ECJ’s competence for preliminary rulings (Article 234, formerly 177, TEC) to a 
code too.
34 This sort of procedure would however meet with several basic 
obstacles. 
 
  First, one must mention the widespread dissatisfaction with the ECJ, 
particularly in private  law, which largely contributes to the poor reputation of 
directives in this sphere and is increasingly discouraging national courts from 
making submissions.
35 Thus, the often poor legal quality of the decisions, 
particularly in the private-law area, is increasingly criticized.
36 Indeed it cannot 
be overlooked that the judges are increasingly out of their depth with the 
universal competence of the Court in the whole of Community law.
37 
Additionally, the dissatisfaction with the ECJ can be attributed to the 
inefficiency of the preliminary ruling procedure (current duration approximately 
two years).
38 The latter problem would presumably be still further intensified by 
the much higher number of cases in the whole private-law area by comparison 
with Community economic law. For it is obvious that with a new European 
code, which for legal technical reasons would have to be kept abstract, initially 
                                                 
34 Cf. eg. Tilman/van Gerven, (Fn. 6), 203, N° 85, who even were a code to be adopted as an 
international treaty, call for interpretative competence to be conveyed to the ECJ. 
35 Though one has to distinguish dogmatically based approaches that grant the ECJ a smaller 
concretization competence specifically in the case of general clauses and general legal 
concepts; cf. W.-H. Roth, in: Kötz/Basedow/Hopt (Eds.), FS Drobnig, 1998, 135. 
36 Representatively, cf. Samara-Krispis/Steindorff, CMLR 29 (1992), 615: “And we dare even 
to submit, that the European Court’s contribution to company law may not justify the 
expectation that the Community, in its present organisation, is qualified to assume 
responsibility for questions of company law and  – probably  – other civil law”; on private law 
see  W.-H. Roth, CMLR 35 (1998), 1013; on the labour-law case law  Junker, NJW 1994, 
2527; on company law  Hommelhoff, in: Schulze (Ed.), Auslegung europäischen Rechts und 
angeglichenen Rechts, 1999, 29 (44). 
37 Cf.  Streinz/Leible,  Die Zukunft des Gerichtssystems der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, 
forthcoming in EWS, text in Fn. 33f. 
38 In many quarters there are also objections to the Court’s “Cartesian style”, inspired by the 
French tradition, in which judgments are more  set up as binding conclusions of a quasi-
scientific nature than justified argumentatively; cf.  Weiler, in: Heiskanen/Kulovesi (Fn. 15), 9 
(17ff); similarly  Leible, in: Martiny/Witzleb (eds.), Auf dem Wege zu einem Europäischen 
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there would be a very high number of submissions with concretisation questions. 
Yet even an expanded centralized jurisdiction would likely be overstrained at 
having to solve private-law problems of over 350 million people. If European 
courts are to be responsible, at least in last instance, for interpreting a code, the 
European court system would accordingly have to be comprehensively 
reformed. Alternatives suggested in the literature, and most recently also in two 
reflection papers written by ECJ judges and ex-judges, are the setting up of a 
Civil Chamber
39 at the ECJ or the Court of First Instance, and further even the 
regionalisation of the Community court system on the American model.
40 
 
  Even these proposals, however, still leave open the most delicate problem: 
guaranteeing the legitimacy of European Court decisions in private law. This 
problem is based, first, on the special  character of this area of law. By 
comparison with economic law, which provides a more general external 
framework for private autonomous action, it is the task of private law to find 
most of the specific solutions to problems. Here, on such central questions as 
risk distribution in law of contract and tort, it focuses more on decentralized 
control and individual fine tuning in which liberal and social criteria, freedom 
and constraint, autonomy and intervention, have to be subtly balanced out.
41 For 
this way of proceeding, the still in part considerably different economic, social 
and cultural rooting of private law in the Member States despite the existence of 
the Common Market is likely to constitute a major hindrance. Familiar examples 
are the repeated failure of a Societas Europaea because of the Mitbestimmung 
(co-determination) problem, or the cases of conflict between national private 
law and European economic law (e.g. fundamental freedoms versus time-limited 
employment contracts
42). Here it has proved a very difficult, touchy undertaking 
to harmonise European norms with differing national framework conditions. 
While this fact is presumably not an argument against a European Code itself, 
since a statutory text that would necessarily have to be kept general c ould 
largely leave knotty problems open, it would emerge in all its intensity when it 
came to authoritative concretisation of the text by a centralized European 
                                                 
39 Available from  http://www.curia.eu.int/de/pres/persp.htm; from the literature  Leible (Fn. 
38), 84; Hackenberg, ZEuP 8 (2000), 860 with further references (Fn. 8). 
40 As already by  Jacqué/Weiler, On the Road to European Union  - A New Judicial 
Architecture, CMLR 27 (1990), 185. The ECJ’s reflection paper (Fn. 39) has now indicated a 
leaning towards this solution. 
41 Cf.  Joerges/Brüggemeier, in: Müller-Graff (Fn. 11), 301 (350f); Teubner, Legal Irritants - 
Why Unifying the Law ends up in New Cleavages, MLR 62 (1998), 1; Preinerstorfer-Riedl, 
in: Feiden/C. Schmid (Fn. 11), 31 = ERPL 8 (2000), 71; and emphatically recently 
Wuermeling/v. Graevenitz (Fn. 11), 12. 
42 Cf. Steindorff, JZ 1995, 94; and in detail Franzen (Fn. 25), 163f. RSCAS 2001/14 © 2001 Christoph U. Schmid  16
judicature.
43 Here there would be an immense danger that European decisions, 
especially if not convincingly justified, would meet with still greater resentment 
than an imposed code. Were one however, in the light of this danger, to stay 
with the sole competence of national courts, then it would be an inevitable 
question whether, in view of the divergences in interpretation that would then 
have to be expected, the ambitious project of a European Code would still be at 
all worthwhile. 
 
4. The need for a suitable institutional body 
 
Further reservations are associated with the need for a suitable body to support 
the code at EC level. The Commission’s dubious suitability has organizational 
and structural grounds. As we know, that body is divided up into Directorates-
General pursuing the various internal-market and integration objectives of the 
EC Treaty. L ike all other law, here private law too is instrumentalised as a 
medium for integration. Thus, as mentioned, according to various political 
opportunities directives are adopted with sometimes contrary protective aims, 
for instance consumer protection versus protecting small business. There is no 
division with adequate staff and technical resources able to develop an overall 
concept of a non-instrumental, consistent, general private law. This is also 
evident in the case of the draft code, on which, as mentioned, five Directorates 
General are involved. 
 
  In these criticisms of the Commission it should not however be forgotten 
that political bodies were not the principals in developing the national civil 
codes in the past either. Usually, extremely distinguished scholarly expert 
groups were engaged, mostly for decades, on producing them. The activities of 
the existing expert academic groups are accordingly to be assessed as 
encouraging signals in the right direction. It cannot however be foreseen 
whether the staff, financial and logistic resources of these associations will be 
adequate in order not merely to develop a draft acceptable to all national legal 
systems but also to defend its quality and consistency in legislative procedures 
against political interventions of national and European institutions.
44 
 
                                                 
43  Joerges, in: Schulte-Nölke/Schulze (eds.), Europäische Rechtsangleichung und nationale 
Privatrechte, 1999, 205 (215ff., Fn. 36) = ERPL 8 (2000), 1 (12ff) 
44 These queries are raised most strongly by the draft of the Académie, which was written by a 
single person, on the basis of opinions and discussions with other members.  Cf.  Stein, in: 
Académie des Privatistes Européens (Fn. 4), 7. RSCAS 2001/14 © 2001 Christoph U. Schmid  17
IV.  Proposed solutions 
 
1. A code as a measure of enhanced co-operation 
 
In order to cope with the uncertainties as to competence (necessity) and 
acceptance, it seems extremely important not to impose a European Code on 
unwilling Member States by majority decision, but to bring it into being only 
consensually. Not even the advantages of a larger number of members could 
justify such an act of power by the Community in limiting national self-
determination in such a sensitive area. The edge might perhaps be taken off the 
resistance by national lawyers were their own State to decide voluntarily in 
favour of a Code. If one is not to be content with a barely effective 
recommendation, however, the premise of consensual action inevitably raises 
the question of how to proceed in the likely event of failure to secure unanimous 
adoption in the Council. Alternatives remaining would be to adopt a Code as a 
measure of enhanced co-operation (Arts. 43-45 TEU, 11 TEC) among Member 
States interested, or as an international agreement outside Community law. 
 
  Despite what various voices in the literature say,
45 the latter would appear 
not to be excluded by the provisions on enhanced co-operation, but would have 
the usual international-law drawbacks of the danger of “rigidification” (since 
amendments would again require unanimity), and possibly also of democratic 
deficits. A measure of enhanced co-operation would by contrast have the 
advantages of being able to utilize the Community’s i nstitutional infrastructure, 
which would presumably ease subsequent necessary amendments.
46 All the 
same, a majority of Member States would have to join the project from the start 
(Art. 44(1)(d) TEU), and each of the States not involved would have a veto 
right, though being required to name important grounds of national policy 
against the measure. These are not easy to conceive in the case of a civil code, 
yet could not be called in doubt by other States (Art. 11(2) TEC). Since however 
if enhanced co-operation were rejected by States outside it the alternative in the 
air that would be well-nigh unstoppable would be an international agreement 
                                                 
45 On the state of opinions see  De Witte,  Old-fashioned Flexibility: International Agreements 
between the Member States of the EU, in: De Búrca/Scott (eds.), Constitutional Change in the 
EU – From Uniformity to Flexibility, 2000, 31 (55). 
46 Majority decisions would be possible only were Art. 95 TEC chosen as legal basis (Art. 44 
(1) TEU, 11(4) TEC). As shown, (footnote 19 above), however, the adoption of a code as 
special law alongside the national codifications, as advocated here, would be possible only 
pursuant to Art. 308 TEC, which requires unanimity. Rigidification tendencies might then be 
countered by an empowerment norm contained in the code allowing majority decisions to 
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outside the Community –where the latter would in principle have no rights at all 
– this way of proceeding might after all be promising. 
 
  Additionally, even a codex adopted as enhanced co-operation should by 
the Community be restricted to interstate situations. While it is true that this sort 
of restriction is scarcely justified any longer technically, since cross border 
transactions in the Common Market can no longer sensibly be treated as foreign 
matters to be dealt with separately. Rather, a uniform solution to reduce the 
complexity of the European multi-level regime and avoid new demarcation 
problems between domestic and intergovernmental situations would seem 
required. However, putting the code into effect for domestic situations too, 
which would have the consequence of largely replacing the national 
codifications, is something that would definitely have to be for the n ational 
parliaments to decide, in view of the reservations mentioned regarding the 
necessity principle and democratic legitimacy.
47 This should as far as possible 
happen at the same time as adoption at European level, even though States 
willing to join should be left open the option of confining application of the 
code, only for a transitional and trial phase, to international situations. 
Additionally, a code would need comprehensive and not just “technical” legal 
preparation by a suitable vehicular institution. 
 
2. Preparation of a “Restatement Code” by a European Law Institute 
 
  A European institutional body would have the essential task of working 
out not just a code but also the framework conditions for its acceptance, through 
the setting up of a pan-European “legal dialogue” and the inclusion of as many 
national laws as possible in the project. As regards practical models for such an 
institution, the American Law Institute (ALI) in particular deserves note.
48 This 
is an independent, private legal institute, set up and administered by scholars and 
practitioners, engaged primarily on systematically researching and presenting 
the case law in “Restatements of the Law”. 
 
                                                 
47 The responsibility of national parliaments would in this connection also have the advantage 
that unsuccessful regulations or ones socially unsuitable for a State (were there genuinely to 
be any) could be amended by the latter should Community amendment fail. The resulting 
differences in law would be less bad than legitimacy deficits. 
48 This proposal was made, for harmonization of company law, also by Werner F. Ebke, who 
is a foreign  member of the ALI:  Ebke, Company law and the EU: Centralised vs. 
Decentralised Lawmaking, Int. Lawyer 31 (1997), 961 (985);  idem,  in: Hübner/Ebke (eds.), 
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a) The American Law Institute (ALI) and Restatements: a survey 
 
The ALI was founded in 1923 following proposals made even before the First 
World War by scholars and practitioners.
49 Its major tasks lie in improving the 
clarity and consistency of the case law, as well as harmonising State laws. To 
this end it publishes “Restatements of the Law”, w hich systematically 
summarise the case law. Restatements in the areas of agency, conflict of laws, 
contracts, property, restitution, torts and trusts were already begun in the 
twenties, and have by now appeared in the second and in part the third 
generation (“Restatements Second” and “Third”). In external form the 
Restatements, in their rules, resemble the continental codifications, but also 
contain comments and illustrations. 
 
  The Restatements are very frequently applied in practice. They allow 
lawyers more easily to research the case material and appeal to an additional  – 
even if not binding – authority, especially in areas where statute or precedent is 
lacking. Courts frequently use the Restatements in order to support their legal 
view, fill lacunae and adjust their own law to developments in other States. All 
in all, the authority of the Restatements as secondary sources of law is clearly 
above that of textbooks and commentaries, and the gain in systematisation and 
unification they bring is manifest. 
 
  In addition to the restatements, the ALI also engages in proposals for 
reforms to laws and in drafting model laws. The best known example is the 
UCC, developed together with the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws – an important public commission of State representatives 
entrusted with projects for unification of laws.
50 The UCC was taken up by all 
the States except Louisiana, and governs the most important areas of 
commercial law, from sales law through law on collateral security to law on 
negotiable instruments. Whereas the Restatements are primarily designed as a 
tool for lawyers and courts, model laws are aimed particularly at State 
legislators. 
 
  Great importance attaches, in connection with possible transfer of the ALI 
concept, to  its internal procedural regulations. For the influence of the 
Restatements is based not only on their quality and the reputation of their 
                                                 
49 For more details see  Gray, E pluribus unum? A Bicentennial Report of Unification of Law 
in the United States, RabelsZ 50 (1986), 111 (119ff.); Schindler, ZEuP 6 (1998), 275; Ebke 
(Fn. 48), 189ff; for a critical evaluation of the ALI’s activities see the contributions in Hofstra 
Law Review 26 (1998), 567ff. 
50 For more details on this institution see Summers (Fn. 12), 202ff. RSCAS 2001/14 © 2001 Christoph U. Schmid  20
writers, but also on the legitimating power of a procedure with integrity.
51 At the 
head of the Institute is a Council, and a director elected by it. He as a rule takes 
the initiative for the production of new Restatements. The director appoints a 
reporter for every project, along with one or more associate reporters, who are 
mostly university professors. They are responsible for organizing and 
implementing the project. They are supported by advisers – as a rule judges, 
lawyers or professors, who give opinions on the drafts presented by the reporter. 
Once the Institute’s director considers a draft is right, he brings it before the 
Council, which may send it back to the reporter or pass it on to the Assembly of 
Institute Members for final decision. An important factor is the strict internal 
rules on neutrality and exclusion of conflicts of interest. While in the case of 
reporters conflicts of interest are generally taken as a ground for refusal, even 
ordinary members wishing to give opinions on the project must in suitable 
fashion disclose interests of their own or their principals. New ALI members are 
elected on a proposal from one of the now some 3,600 ordinary members with 
the support of two other members, by the Council’s Membership Committee. As 
far as the Institute’s funding is concerned, running costs are covered by 
membership fees, while for individual projects mostly o utside funds from 
foundations, firms, legal professional associations or even the authorities are 
employed. 
 
b) Utilising the American experience 
 
The basic features of the ALI  – its “trans-state” character, the appropriate 
representation of all legal professions and the social and economic interests they 
represent, the good co-operation with political institutions, a precise, legitimacy-
creating procedure, and the high quality and expertise of its projects – make it an 
attractive model for a European “legal Institute” in the broadest sense of the 
term. In democratic respects, this sort of institution could additionally, by 
training up a sectoral  demos of a transnational community of European lawyers 




  On the ALI model, it would seem best for legal scholars to be able to 
found and run an ELI, together with practitioners. Particularly suitable for this 
might be the existing academic working groups like the Study Group and the 
Académie des Privatistes Européens, along with European professional 
organizations like the  Union des Avocats Européens or the  Conseil des 
                                                 
51 Ebke (Fn. 46), 207f. 
52 On the construction of sectoral  demoi cf., from the political-science literature, Abromeit/T. 
Schmidt, in: Kohler-Koch (ed.), Regieren in entgrenzten Räumen, 1998, 293. RSCAS 2001/14 © 2001 Christoph U. Schmid  21
Barrreaux de l’Union Européenne. It would be advantageous if the European 
Parliament and/or the Commission  – with which it presumably has the highest 
affinity, in line with its monitoring task and harmonisation mission – could take 
on the sponsorship for an Institute and assist with creating the requisite 
infrastructure. 
 
  National ministries of justice and professional organizations ought also to 
be included in order to let the institute have the broadest possible basis of 
support. This sort of organisationally heavy establishment ought to have enough 
time allowed. For the advance in trust and legitimacy associated with the 
intellectual parenthood of the successful ALI, ought not to be wasted by setting 
up a small project without adequate basis. Without a profile of its own made 
adequately known to the legal public, an ELI might merely take its place in the 
long line of organizations already in being. In this connection it would also have 
to be ensured that the ELI should by no means appear as competition to legal 
professional organizations and academic research groups, but as an umbrella 
organization set up and maintained by them themselves. 
 
  The organs to be created within an ELI and their tasks and procedures 
would, as with the ALI, have to be laid down in a special Statute. As with the 
ALI, value should be placed on political neutrality and the avoidance of 
conflicts of interest, in order to lend the institute’s recommendations greater 
legitimising effect. As already successfully practised in existing initiatives, a 
balanced European composition should additionally be guaranteed. In this 
connection the Statutes of the Académie des Privatistes Européens, which take 
reference to Member States’ representation in the European Parliament, might 
be a solution worthy of consideration.
53 In technical respects, only academic 
quality standards should decide. Something particularly to be avoided would be 
the effort of delegates, familiar from the drafting of international agreements, to 
impose as many as possible constructions of their own law without regard to 
quality or alternatives, through linkage deals, strategic alliances and the like. 
The experience of the existing expert groups has however been very positive in 
this respect, and should help to rule out such undesirable developments. 
 
  The tasks of an ELI could be very varied. In order to be present in 
lawyers’ everyday work and thus promote the emergence of a transnational 
“legal community”, it should make available such legal working tools as 
statutory texts and secondary literature, information on national legal systems 
and court judgements available on the Internet. To support the Commission’s 
law-making activity, the Institute might set up advisory academic committees, as 
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has long been the practice in areas of regulatory law.
54 An ELI’s most important 
task would, however, lie in adapting the concept of Restatements t o make it 
useful for preparing European legislative measures, most notably a Civil Code. 
 
c) An “integrative Restatement Code” with a common European commentary 
section 
 
In developing a draft European Civil Code one can – as the study group also 
intends – start from the valuable preliminary work of the Lando Commission on 
contract law, which itself calls its existing drafts a Restatement and has largely 
taken over the external form of the American Restatements. Since an appropriate 
stance on the content of a code is not possible within the limits of this paper, a 
few notes on sensitive points must suffice. 
 
  First, a code should be prepared as a single project “en bloc”, not in 
stages. In particular, a “purified consolidation” of the existing private-law 
directives at an initial stage
55 would likely neither adequately guarantee the 
consistency of the overall project nor lead to any noteworthy improvement in 
legal implementation problems in the European multi-level system that would be 
worth the effort. Certainly, a comprehensive Restatement Code should, by 
contrast with the Lando Principles which were developed on a comparative-law 
basis from the various national legal systems, produce a synthesis of all the 
components of the European multi-level system (“integrative” Restatement).
56 
European directives in force as well as important international law like the UN 
Sales Law Convention (CISG) would have to be taken into account, as would 
general principles of law accepted by the ECJ, substantive implications of the 
EEC Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement, and regulations of 
Community economic law with private-law connections such as the provisions 
on the conclusion of contracts contained in public procurement law. This way of 
proceeding should enable solutions in central areas like the concept of 
conformity of the good with the contract that would already be legally valid, 
where UN law of sales and the guarantee directive differ only very slightly.
57 
The synthesising procedure described should further lead to an appropriate 
                                                 
54 Cf.  Joerges/Vos, European Committees, 1999. On the proposal for an advisory committee 
see also Kieninger/Leible (Fn. 30). 
55 As in the preliminary conclusions of the EP Working Document (Fn. 21), p. 5, N° 6(b) and 
(c). 
56 As already in  Basedow  (Fn. 11), 121. The Study Group has undertaken to take this 
requirement into account, cf.. v. Bar (Fn. 6), 149. 
57 It would of course have to be verified how far UN law of sales is also appropriate for 
domestic contracts and consumer sales contracts, or else separation of consumer and 
commercial law of sales is needed; cf. v. Bar (Fn. 6), 149f. RSCAS 2001/14 © 2001 Christoph U. Schmid  23
relationship between liberal and social elements in the “Restatement Code”. The 
integration, de lege lata practically unavoidable, of the consumer and social 
protection so far mostly contained in European and national special laws  in 
particular disclosing obligations, withdrawal rights and judicial interventions 
into contracts, ought however to lead to a stronger emphasis on a general 
principle of “contractual solidarity” as a counterweight to contractual freedom
58 
- something that ought not to be substantively at the expense of the latter. 
 
  Moreover, despite the associated cost, it seems worthy of consideration to 
expand the commentary section of the Restatement still further by comparison 
with the Lando principles.
59 Since replacing the national codifications would 
make even the existing secondary literature hardly usable any longer, good 
practical usability and broadly unified interpretation would be achievable only if 
alongside the Restatement rules a “common European commentary” could be 
supplied at the same time, in at least the extent of a mid size commentary on 
national private law. This level of concretisation may at first sight seem 
Utopian; all the same, Christian v. Bar’s two monumental volumes on European 
law of tort
60 already constitute comprehensive preliminary work in one central 
area. In detail, the commentary section should show national statutory 
provisions and precedents compatible with the Restatement rules. This would to 
a certain extent preserve the  acquis of national case law by transferring it to 
European level. Conversely, for clarity reasons departures from national laws or 
central precedents not unambiguously obvious from the rules alone should be 
indicated in the commentary. Additionally, the commentary section should also 
contain methodical indications particularly on permissible methods of 
interpretation and judicial law-making, which should also be worked out on a 
pan-European basis. Finally, the Restatement should also contain a conflict-of-
laws section. This should, i n continuation of the Rome Convention, contain a 
comprehensive unitary law of conflict focused specifically on the interplay 
between the code and autonomous private law (particularly in areas not 
included, like law on real property, family law and inheritance). Additionally, 
internationality-related demarcation norms to separate domestic and European 
situations should be required, should some Member States wish, for a 
                                                 
58 Cf.  Lurger, Vertragliche Solidarität  – Entwicklungschance für das allgemeine Vertragsrecht 
in Österreich und in der EU, 1998. 
59 The fact that the  Académie law-of-contract draft contains no systematic commentary 
section at all makes it less useful for statutory adoption in its present form. 
60 First volume: Die Kernbereiche des Deliktsrechts, seine Angleichung in Europa und seine 
Einbettung in die Gesamtrechtsordnungen, 1996 (English translation: The common European 
Law of Torts, 1998); Second volume: Schaden und Schadensersatz, Haftung für und ohne 
eigenes Fehlverhalten, Kausalität und Verteidigungsgründe, 1998; review in  C. Schmid, OJLS 
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transitional period or longer, to put the code in force only for cross-border 
transactions. 
 
  The integrative Restatement with a common European commentary 
section so conceived could provide valuable service even before the enactment 
of its rules as a Code (and even if this project were to fail!). As a secondary 
source of law consisting partly  of binding supranational or international 
elements, this sort of compilation might not just make an important contribution 
to the Europeanisation of legal scholarship and legal training, but also offer 
important assistance with interpretation, in both Community law and national 
law.
61 As a preparation for enacting the Code, it would be advisable in a 
transitional stage to lay down the obligation for a comparative interpretation on 




  Finally, as far as the legitimacy of a “Restatement Code” is concerned, it 
should already largely be secured by convincing quality, preparation and 
“ratification” by an ELI, and subsequent involvement of the political 
institutions. Additionally, however, it is likely to be of decisive importance to 
ensure the effectiveness and social appropriateness of its judicial concretisation. 
 
3. Non-binding interpretation of a Code by a European court of private law 
 
As stated, the question of the division of roles between European and national 
courts in concretising a Code is in tension between the requirement for legal 
unity and the problematic legitimacy of imposed central decisions, which could 
not always adequately take social, c ultural and economic peculiarities of 
individual Member States into account. A sustainable solution can lie only in a 
compromise that takes account of both interests. This could take the form of 
prescribing in national law a preliminary-ruling procedure that should be given 
effective form, to apply to domestic situations too (for which the Code, as stated, 
should apply only by virtue of a national order), though subject to important 
modifications to protect national autonomy. First, because of the large number 
of private-law disputes it should be confined to cases of fundamental 
importance, and to departures from decisions by a (domestic or foreign) Higher 
Court – that is, cases where the recourse of appeal is permissible domestically. 
Submissions would have to be answered by a European court of private law, 
                                                 
61 In national law too, comparative-law interpretation is generally regarded as admissible.  Cf. 
e.g.  Schulze, ZfRV 1997, 183;  Odersky  ZEuP 2 (1994), 1;  Monateri/Somma, „Alien in 
Rome“, L’ uso del diritto  comparato come interpretazione analogica ex art. 12 preleggi, Il 
Foro Italiano 1999, V 47. 
62 As convincingly put by v. Bar, hearing before EP Legal Affairs Committee on 21.11.2000. RSCAS 2001/14 © 2001 Christoph U. Schmid  25
which might be associated as a special Chamber with the ECJ (or Court of First 
Instance), and which might be staffed with specialized judges from various 
Member States. Though submissions from national courts at all levels should be 
admissible, the European decision ought  not to be binding for the higher or 
supreme courts of a State.
63 Its bindingness should instead only take the form of 
a target norm, though the national court would certainly have the duty to discuss 
the European decision in qualified fashion and substantiate any departures from 
it.
64 The principal decision of the national higher court ought then to be 
published together with the European one in an official collection in all 




  As with public international law arbitration, the limited normative 
bindingness of the decisions ought to have a positive effect on their legal 
quality.
66 On the side  of the national courts, high-level European 
recommendations would similarly bring out a considerable acceptance pressure 
that would largely guarantee the uniform application of the law in a great 
number of cases. Because of the publication obligation, differing national 
interpretations would become known and ought therefore not to cause any great 
damage to legal certainty. Because of the neutral, independent professional ethos 
of judges widespread throughout Europe, it is presumably relatively unlikely, by 
contrast with the case in political bodies, for them to allow themselves to decline 
into henchmen of public or private domestic interests. Should, however, doubts 
nonetheless arise in this respect, a European “legal community” institutionalized 
through an  ELI would ensure enhanced perception and criticism from all 
Member States. 
 
                                                 
63 If a national law court makes a submission, and after receiving the European decision takes 
the view that it cannot accept it, a sort of “leapfrogging” to the national supreme court should 
be provided for, which would have sole competence to reject the European decision. 
64 It would also seem conceivable in the case of border-crossing situations to keep to a 
binding decision of a European court which, because of its neutrality, would enjoy greater 
legitimacy here. To be sure, the European court would then have to decide bindingly on the 
classification of a given situation. 
65 Among many cf. Thomas/Putzo, ZPO, 22nd ed. 2000, vor § 1025, Rz. 3.  
66 This is confirmed by, for instance, the judgments of the WTO dispute settlement body 
(consisting of panels and an appellate body), which are exposed to extreme legitimacy and 
acceptance pressure particularly from the most powerful members, and have responded with 
noteworthy technical quality, balance and exhaustiveness. Cf.  Howse, Adjudicative 
Legitimacy and Treaty Interpretation in International Trade Law, in: Collected Courses of the 
Academy of European Law 1998. RSCAS 2001/14 © 2001 Christoph U. Schmid  26
IV. Conclusion 
 
All in all, the solution of a private law unified at norm level and monitored only 
non-bindingly by a European Court should have manifold advantages. On the 
one hand, the most important basic civil-law questions would be clarified 
uniformly, bringing most of the advantages of a code mentioned. Additionally, 
judicial concretisations of it would for the first time become at all comparable 
for the broad mass of lawyers  – not just for a few specialized comparative 
lawyers. This could permit a pan-European legal dialogue that ought also 
considerably to improve the framework conditions for competition among 
various alternatives in concretisation. It seems most important, though, for the 
main responsibility of national courts to be retained, so that problems of social 
adequacy and acceptance of European decisions ought not to arise. This 
proposal should accordingly make a contribution to enabling European 
governance to be based minimally on command and constraint and maximally 
on argument and conviction, thereby ensuring its legitimacy. 
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